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T he bilateral development aid by the Federal Republic of Germany is on principle not tied to German deliveries. Exceptions are made only in favour of supplies and services in what are known as "sensitive economic sectors" -i. e. at present ships, railway engines and carriages, nuclear power stations, and consulting services 1. In the average of the years 1976-79 a little less than one-quarter of all bilateral development aid by the Federal Republic was formally tied 2 but as much as about 70 % of the aid funds was nevertheless spent on supplies from German firms. In addition, follow-up exports are triggered off because development aid covers as a rule only part of the cost of a project or because the project is tailored to German systems or specifications or because it improves the political and psychological receptiveness for German products. The German economy also benefits to some extent from bilateral development aid by other donor countries as well as the disbursements of multilateral institutions. Besides, insofar as development aid gives momentum to the development process in the Third World, it generates a demand for additional German exports because of the recipient countries' high import propensity.
A quantification of the resultant impulses for the export trade of the Federal Republic of Germany is subject to certain limitations. The analysis in the present report is for this reason confined to those effects which can be sufficiently precisely attributed to development aid. They include in particular the return flows from bilateral capital aid and (public) technical assistance by the Federal Republic of Germany 3. * Deutsches Institut fLir Wirtschaftsforschung. -The present article was first published in German in Wochenbericht des DIW, No. 8/81.
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The bulk of the bilateral development aid of the Federal Republic takes the form of capital aid (financial cooperation). It is handled by Kreditanstalt fL~r Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) and used chiefly to finance individual investment projects. 30 % of all capital aid is provided without project links for imports of current requirements (e. g. raw materials and spare parts). In the average of the years 1976-79 the developing countries spent almost two-thirds of the capital aid, both project-linked and non-project-linked, in the Federal Republic. The mechanical engineering industry was the principal beneficiary. It accounted for more than half of all orders to German firms in connection with project-linked and 40 % with nonproject-linked aid. Electrical engineering and vehicle building followed at some distance. These three large capital goods industries together accounted for more than 80 % of the German deliveries. The only other beneficiaries from return flows from project-linked capital aid of any significance were the construction industry and other services (more specifically, engineering and architectural services). A significant part of the return flows from non-project-linked aid (11%) went to the chemical industry. 
Impact on Production and Employment
With the aid of input-output computations it has been ascertained how far the production and the working 
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Due to the increase in development aid, its employment effect in 1979 was still higher, even if -otherwise than in Table 2 -allowing for the increase of productivity compared with 1976.
The effects showed themselves most clearly in mechanical engineering, other services, electrical engineering, vehicle building, metal production and processing. Two-thirds of the entire production and employment effects of development aid accrued in these five sectors s. Development aid-induced orders account however -on the basis of the 1979 disbursements -in all sectors for less than 1% of production and employment. The mechanical engineering industry (0.8 %) and vehicle building (0.4 %) recorded the highest relative figures. The development aid would have to be raised by 25 % to lift the share of aid-induced orders in mechanical engineering production and employment (under otherwise unchanged conditions) to about 1%.
If the German development aid is stepped up in 1981 as planned -by about 10 % -it will increase in real terms by 5 %, i. e. the same rate as in 1980. This is significantly less than in the preceding years, so thatif productivity increases as expected -its effect on employment is unlikely to be greater than in 1979. If an estimate of this demand 8 is added to the return flows analysed so far (estimated at DM 2.2 bn for 1979), the total of the orders to German firms rises to quite a different level, namely to about DM 6.2 bn, with nearly DM 2 bn of return flows from multilateral sources as its largest component. One-tenth of all exports from the Federal Republic of Germany to developing countries (incl. the OPEC states) in 1979 thus appears to have been financed by development aid.
Effects of Total Development
s Compared with the effects of the total exports of the Federal Republic of Germany to the Third World, the production and employment effects of the development aid-financed demand are concentrated to a larger extent on the mechanical and electrical engineering industries, the construction industry and the other services; the chemical and vehicle industries are not involved to the same extent. Cf. R. F i I i p -K 6 h n, R. Krengel, D. Schumacher, op. cit.,p. 43ff.
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE
The aid allocations which were not used for placing direct orders with German firms -all in all, the developing countries received in 1979 over DM 51 bn in bilateral aid and from multilateral sources -went to other countries where they generated an indirect demand for German goods. The German exports induced in this way may be estimated at amounting to another DM 900 mn 7.
For 1979 the total demand for German goods and services generated by development aid may be put at about DM 7.1 bn. This corresponds to a gross production value of DM 13-14 bn and over 100,000 jobs.
Summary
The employment effect deriving from orders directly financed by bilateral German development aid -over 1,200 jobs for DM 100 mn of disbursements -is indeed smaller than that from an equal outlay for internal purposesinvestments or private or public consumption 8. But the mentioned figure does not allow for thenot easily quantifiableindirect repercussions over time of the goodwill effect of such aid and the extra purchasing power accruing to the developing countries on the German export trade. Bearing in mind further that decisions concerning the 6 The public technical assistance ratios were used for the orders deriving from non-public technical assistance. The orders financed by multilateral sources were estimated at 14 % of the World Bank group disbursements and 10 % of those by other multilateral donors (cf. G. As h o f f, D. We is s : Binnenwirtschaftliche Wirkungen der deutschen Entwicklungspolitik (Internal economic effects of the German development policy), Berlin 1978, Appendix, p. 5). The orders resulting from bilateral development aid by other donor countries were estimated at 12 % of their untied disbursements, i. e. in line with the share of the Federal Republic of Germany in the total exports of the western industrialized countries to non-European developing countries (excl. OPEC).
7 On the assumption that they amount to 2 % of the development aidfinanced orders going to others than German firms, which corresponds to the ratio of exports of the Federal Republic to the western industrialized and the developing countries to the national product of these two groups of countries. size of the German development aid may arouse a response from other donors, the actual effect on employment is to be put much higher than the figure of 1,200 jobs suggests.
It may be assumed that every D-Mark spent on development aid will be returned to the German economy in full -in part directly and immediately and in part with some delay in a roundabout way 9. More development aid instead of other spending does not mean less production inside the Federal Republic but more production for others.
It emerges from the model computations that the effect on the German labour market of any change in the overall level of development aid by the western industrialized countries is of the order of 1,000 jobs for 1% of increase or decrease. The drastic cutback of American foreign aid currently under discussion in the USA would therefore have an effect also on employment in the Federal Republic of Germany.
Employment aspects should not however be the principal consideration in a discussion of development aid. The essential motives for development aid are humanitarian, moral and political. The positive repercussions of exports on the employment situation in the donor country are a side-effect. They may however make a decision to increase the aid allocations easier ~~ 8 TO go by the findings of the DIW in its structural reports the comparable employment effects of DM 100 mn of disbursements were in,1976: for investments nearly 1,800 jobs, for private consumption over 1,600 jobs and for public consumption almost 2,300 jobs. Cf. DIW: Struktureller Wandel und seine Folgen fur die Besch&ftigung -Zwischenbericht zur Strukturberichterstattung (Structural change and its consequences for employment -interim report), mimeo., Berlin 1979, p. 33 and 113. 
